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EU Trade and Investment Policy 
since the Treaty of Lisbon: 
Achievements and future priorities 




This paper analyses the most salient developments in the EU’s trade and investment policy 
since the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, and sketches the key trade challenges and 
priorities for the current Commission. In particular, it analyses how the EU institutions applied 
their newly conferred competences within a new institutional set-up in order to address the 
various internal and external challenges facing EU trade policy.  
The paper demonstrates that since the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon more than a 
decade ago, the EU institutions have had to constantly use their newly conferred competences 
within a new institutional set-up to address the various internal and external challenges. 
Moreover, it argues that a more assertive trade policy under the ‘geopolitical’ von der Leyen 
Commission will be consolidated and further reinforced in the ongoing trade review of the EU’s 
trade policy, which will aim to contribute to the EU’s post-Covid 19 recovery in line with the 




This paper analyses the most salient developments in the EU’s trade and investment policy 
since the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, and sketches the key trade challenges and 
priorities for the current Commission. In particular, it analyses how the EU institutions have 
applied their newly conferred competences within a new institutional set-up to address the 
various internal and external challenges posed to EU trade policy.  
The Treaty of Lisbon not only reclassified the common commercial policy (CCP) by submitting 
it to the general policy objectives of the Union’s external action (Article 21 TEU); it also 
significantly reformed both its scope and its procedures. The most important changes brought 
about relate to the broadened scope of exclusive CCP competences under Article 207 TFEU 
(e.g. in relation to foreign direct investment), and the increased role of the European 
Parliament. 
The EU had to roll out its reformed CCP in an increasingly challenging internal political 
environment. Mainly as a consequence of negotiations with the US on a transatlantic trade and 
investment partnership (TTIP), a heated debate emerged within the EU on the benefits and the 
consequences of the Union’s embrace of trade-promoting FTAs. Several member state 
governments, numerous Members of the European Parliament, as well as national parliaments 
of member states and civil society groups questioned the appropriateness of the Union’s trade 
policy.  
Externally, the Union was also confronted with challenging developments: China’s unique 
combination of one-party system and almost uncurtailed free market economy has diminished 
the relevance of several WTO rules, motivating the Union to undertake significant reform of its 
trade defence arsenal. The crisis of the WTO’s rulebook went beyond subsidies and trade 
remedies law. Apart from some minor technical successes, reform of the WTO agreement 
remained elusive. With the 45th US president taking office, US scepticism towards the 
multilateral trading system has given way to open hostility, leading to the demise of the 
appellate body, and therefore a shattered dispute settlement mechanism, and a deep crisis of 
the multilateral trading system.  
More recently, global trade and international supply chains have faced an unprecedented shock 
following the social and economic shutdown caused by Covid-19. The Commission’s 2020 
spring economic forecast estimates that the EU economy will contract by 7.4% in 2020, while 
global GDP is predicted to shrink by 3.5%, and global trade by more than 10% in that period. A 
V-shaped recovery by 2021 has become unlikely.  
In June 2020, i.e. during the height of the pandemic, the European Commission launched a 
review of the EU’s trade and investment policy,1 aiming to assess the potential contribution of 
international trade to a rapid and sustainable socio-economic recovery of the Union. The 
‘geopolitical’ Commission of President von der Leyen has declared ‘Open Strategic Autonomy’ 
 
1The review can be read here: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_1058 
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to be the strategic goal to be implemented through a new trade strategy.2 Originally scheduled 
for autumn 2020, the new trade strategy is now expected by the end of the year, to ensure the 
new Trade Commissioner’s input and endorsement.3 Against this background, this paper 
analyses the key developments in the EU’s trade and investment policy since the entry into 
force of the Treaty of Lisbon, and outlines the most important trade challenges and priorities 
for the current Commission.  
This paper demonstrates that while under the Barroso II Commission trade policy was framed 
as a key instrument in delivering the growth needed to emerge from the global financial crisis 
(GFC), the ‘Trade for all’ strategy developed under the Juncker Commission further broadened 
the trade agenda by aiming to strengthen the effectiveness, transparency and value-dimension 
of the EU’s CCP, against the background of internal and external contestation of the EU’s trade 
policy.4 This strategy resulted in the conclusion of a new generation of FTAs, more transparency 
during FTA negotiations, a new system for investor-state disputes, and reformed trade defence 
instruments. Attempts to rebuild the multilateral system for trade and investment, through 
proposals on WTO reform and the MIC, remained unsuccessful. From the very outset, the 
‘geopolitical’ von der Leyen Commission envisaged a more assertive trade policy, focussing on 
ensuring a level playing field and proper enforcement of EU trade instruments, as for example 
evidenced by the creation of the position of Chief Trade Enforcement Officer, and proposals 
regarding a reinforced foreign direct investment screening mechanism, an instrument on 
foreign subsidies, an international procurement instrument, and the modernisation of the 
enforcement regulation. This paper argues that the ongoing review of the EU’s trade policy is 
likely to confirm and further consolidate this approach. On the basis of ‘Open Strategic 
Autonomy’, which is at the heart of the current CCP review and is the new leitmotif for post-
Covid-19 recovery, the EU will aim assertively to protect European business and consumers, 






3 See: https://trade.ec.europa.eu/consultations/index.cfm?consul_id=266. 
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Does Europe not, now that is finally unified, have a leading role to play in a new 
world order, that of a power able both to play a stabilising role worldwide and to 
point the way ahead for many countries and peoples? (Laeken Declaration, 2001) 
 
1. Introduction 
The Laeken Declaration – which spurred a decade of treaty change that ultimately led to the 
Treaty of Lisbon – is an optimistic document: it anticipated for the European Union an 
important role in the concert of nations, and proposed to enable the Union to carry out an 
effective and coherent foreign policy in order to address the challenges brought by a 
“globalised; yet also fragmented world”.5 Many of these aspirations in the field of foreign 
relations have not yet materialised. When the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force in December 
2009, Europe struggled with the global financial crisis and the ensuing eurozone crisis, which 
weakened its ability to speak to the rest of the world with one voice. Also, the Union, created 
to ensure peace between its member states, had to deal with war and occupation at its eastern 
border. The satisfaction of contributing to China’s re-integration into the multilateral trading 
system was soon overshadowed by what has been perceived as overly aggressive Chinese 
efforts to assert itself as a global power. The European Union, in contrast, has lost influence in 
many parts of the world, nowhere more visibly than in the Middle East and Africa, and has seen 
a permanent member of the security council give up its member state status.  
The somewhat mixed success of establishing the EU as a global actor in all fields of international 
governance has not affected its influence as an economic power of the first order: when it 
comes to trade and investment, the Union – which is, after all, the world’s largest trader – 
matters internationally.  
Before the Treaty of Lisbon, the EU’s common commercial policy (CCP), more commonly 
referred to as the EU’s trade policy, was essentially a stand-alone external policy,  decoupled 
from other EU external policy objectives and instruments. The European Commission and 
Council had a quasi-duopoly on trade issues as the European Parliament had a very limited role 
to play in the adoption of trade legislation or treaties. The scope of the CCP initially covered 
only trade in goods. Through treaty revisions, and in particular the ECJ-sanctioned expansive 
practice of the Commission, this scope became broader. However, in Opinion 1/94, the court 
rejected the view advanced, that the common commercial policy pursuant to Article 133 TEC 
granted the community the competence to act in all areas of the multilateral trading system, 
which since the creation for the WTO encompassed trade in services, intellectual property 
rights, and potentially investment protection. The community’s trade agenda reflected this 
more limited legal fundament, focusing essentially on trade defence and the conclusion of basic 
 
5 European Council, “Laeken Declaration of 15 December 2001 on the future of the European Union”, 
15 December 2001. 
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free trade agreements – covering mainly trade in goods– with a clear focus on the neighbouring 
countries and former colonies of some member states. 
The Treaty of Lisbon brought significant changes to the common commercial policy (CCP). It re-
established the parallelism between the multilateral trading system and the external economic 
trade competence of the Union. Internally, it submitted it to the general policy objectives of 
the Union’s external action (Article 21 TEU) and significantly reformed both its scope and its 
procedures. The most important changes brought about relate to the broadened scope of 
exclusive CCP competences under Article 207 TFEU (e.g. in relation to foreign direct 
investment) and the increased role of the European Parliament: without the latter’s approval, 
the Council may not conclude trade agreements. Moreover, Parliament became a co-legislator 
for CCP legislation pursuant to the ordinary legislative procedure.  
The EU had to roll out its reformed CCP in an increasingly challenging internal political 
environment. Mainly as a consequence of negotiations with the US on a transatlantic trade and 
investment partnership (TTIP) a heated debate emerged within the EU on the benefits and the 
consequences of the Union’s embrace of trade-promoting FTAs. Several member state 
governments, numerous Members of the European Parliament, national parliaments of 
member states, and civil society groups contested elements of the Union’s trade policy. 
Concerns were raised publicly about the negative impact on the Union’s environmental and 
labour standards, and the sell-out of democratic choices of citizens (‘right to regulate’). The 
debate reached its climax in October 2016 when Wallonia threatened to block the signing of 
the comprehensive economic and trade agreement with Canada (CETA).  
Externally, the Union was also confronted with challenging developments: China’s unique 
combination of one-party system and almost uncurtailed free market economy has diminished 
the relevance of several WTO rules, motivating the Union to undertake a significant reform of 
its trade defence arsenal. The crisis of the WTO’s rulebook went beyond subsidies and trade 
remedies law. Apart from some minor technical successes, reform of the WTO agreement 
remained elusive. With the 45th US president taking office, US scepticism towards the 
multilateral trading system has given way to open hostility, leading to the demise of the 
appellate body, and therefore a shattered dispute settlement mechanism, and a deep overall 
crisis of the multilateral trading system. 
More recently, global trade and international supply chains have faced an unprecedented shock 
following the social and economic shutdown caused by Covid-19.The Commission’s 2020 spring 
economic forecast estimates that the EU economy will contract by 7.4% in 2020, while global 
GDP is predicted to shrink by 3.5%, and global trade by more than 10% during that period. A V-
shaped recovery by 2021 has become unlikely. The Union and many of its trading partners have 
adopted export restrictions with regard to essential goods (in particular medical supplies and 
personal protective equipment (PPE)). Potentially more worrisome, local content requirements 
and the creation of domestic capacity are being discussed as a way to decrease the dependence 
on countries that are now perceived as being unreliable partners in times of crisis. In addition, 
governments have instituted crisis support schemes designed to preserve employment and 
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economic stability (pre-Covid-19), often not fully compatible with the disciplines of the WTO 
subsidy regime. While typically intended to be temporary, these state measures risk becoming 
permanent trade barriers, thereby further eroding the international rules-based trading 
system.  
In June 2020, during the height of the pandemic, the European Commission launched a review 
of the EU’s trade and investment policy6 aiming to assess the possible contribution of 
international trade to a rapid and sustainable socio-economic recovery for the Union. The 
‘geopolitical’ Commission of President von der Leyen has declared ‘Open Strategic Autonomy’ 
to be the strategic goal to be implemented through a new trade strategy.7 Originally scheduled 
for autumn 2020, the new strategy is now expected by the end of the year to ensure the new 
trade commissioner’s input and endorsement.8 
The tenth anniversary of the Treaty of Lisbon thus marks an appropriate moment to take stock 
of the EU’s reformed CCP. This paper will analyse the most salient developments in the EU’s 
CCP since the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon. In particular, it will address how the EU 
institutions have applied their newly conferred competences within a new institutional set-up 
to address the various internal and external challenges posed to the EU trade policy. The paper 
first discusses the trade policies and instruments adopted under the Barroso II Commission 
(2.1) and the Juncker Commission (2.2). Then, the priorities and challenges for the EU’s trade 
and investment policy for the ‘geopolitical’ von der Leyen Commission are explored, taking into 
account the trade-related challenges brought by the Covid-19 pandemic and the ongoing 
review process of the EU’s trade policy.  
2. An overview of EU trade and investment policies since the Treaty of Lisbon 
2.1 EU trade policy under the Barroso II Commission 
The first decade of the Treaty of Lisbon overlapped almost exactly with two Commission terms, 
the Barroso II Commission (2009-2014) and the Juncker Commission (2014-2019).  
2.1.1  The new generation of Comprehensive FTAs 
The Barroso II Commission’s trade and investment policy was guided by Trade  Commissioner 
Karel De Gucht. Under his ’Trade, Growth and World Affairs’ strategy,9 the EU’s trade policy 
was supposed to become more assertive, and to deliver the growth needed to emerge from 
the global financial crisis (GFC). This strategy was largely a continuation of the 2006 ‘Global 
 
6 See : https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_1058 
7 See:https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/communication-europe-moment-repair-prepare-next-generation.pdf 
8 See: https://trade.ec.europa.eu/consultations/index.cfm?consul_id=266 
9 European Commission, “Trade, Growth and World Affairs. Trade Policy as a Core Component of the EU’s 2020 
Strategy”, COM (2010) 612, 9 November 2010. 
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Europe’ strategy10 which, in the context of the stalled WTO Doha round, had prioritised the 
conclusion of a new generation of comprehensive trade agreements with key partners. These 
FTAs were to be “comprehensive and ambitious in coverage, aiming at the highest degree of 
trade liberalisation including far-reaching liberalisation of services and investment”.11 In light 
of the growing integration of global supply chains and increased importance of ‘behind-the-
border’ issues, the new generation FTAs had to cover, in addition to the liberalisation of trade 
in goods, inter alia, services and establishment, investment, competition policy, regulatory 
issues, intellectual property rights (IPR), trade-related energy, trade and sustainable 
development, and public procurement. 
Starting with the FTA with South Korea in 2010, the Union concluded a number of ambitious 
‘new generation’ FTAs with key trading partners, including Colombia and Peru (2012), and 
Central America (2012). The EU also concluded a specific type of deep and comprehensive free 
trade agreements (DCFTAs) with Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia (2013) in the context of 
establishing comprehensive association relationships. These DCFTAs aim to gradually and 
partially integrate these countries into the EU internal market on the basis of legislative 
approximation.12 Negotiations with other key trade partners were started, including the United 
States (TTIP), Canada (CETA), Japan, ASEAN member countries and China (Comprehensive 
Agreement in Investment (CAI)). 
2.1.2 The role of the European Parliament 
In this context, the coming of age of the European Parliament in all trade matters under the 
reformed CCP merits attention. Under its first post-Lisbon chairman, Professor Vital Moreira, 
Parliament’s International Trade Committee (INTA) established that Parliament’s consent 
pursuant to Article 218 (6) TFEU had to be “informed consent”, in light of Article 218 (10) TFEU’s 
demand that the European Parliament needs to be “immediately and fully” informed at all 
stages of the negotiation procedure. Parliament and Commission gave full effect to these treaty 
provisions in their bilateral 2010 framework agreement.13 This framework agreement provides 
that the Commission needs to inform the European Parliament about its intention to propose 
the start of negotiations at the same time as it informs the Council, to present draft negotiating 
directives to European Parliament, and to “take due account of European Parliament’s 
comments throughout the negotiations”. Moreover, the Commission committed itself to 
keeping European Parliament regularly and promptly informed about the conduct of 
negotiations, and to explain whether and how Parliament’s comments were taken into account 
 
10 European Commission, “Global Europe: Competing in the World”, COM (2006) 567 final, 4 October 2006. 
11 Ibid. 
12 On this issue, see G. Van der Loo, The EU-Ukraine Association Agreement and Deep and Comprehensive Free 
Trade Area: A new legal instrument for EU integration without membership (Brill Nijhoff, 2016), p. 1-416 and the 
trilogy of handbooks on these DCFTAs, prepared in the context of CEPS’ 3DCFTA project: https://3dcftas.eu/ 
publications/. 
13 Framework Agreement on relations between the European Parliament and the European Commission, OJ 2010 
L 304/47. 
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in the texts under negotiation. In the case of international agreements that require the 
European Parliament’s consent (such as FTAs), the Commission also agreed to provide to 
Parliament during the negotiation process all relevant information that it provides to the 
Council, including draft amendments to adopted negotiating directives, draft negotiating texts, 
agreed articles, the agreed date for initialling the agreement, and the text of the agreement to 
be initialled. Not surprisingly, the Council was critical of these arrangements, since, it argued, 
they gave the Parliament a role in FTA negotiations that was not provided for in the treaties.14 
The duty to keep Parliament properly informed led to a number of disputes between the 
Council and Parliament, some of which ended up before the ECJ, and in which the European 
Parliament ultimately prevailed.15 In the 2016 Better Law-Making Agreement, all three EU 
institutions commit to dealing with this issue by envisaging special negotiations on improved 
practical arrangements for cooperation and information sharing in the context of international 
agreements.16 However, the negotiations on this delicate issue have stalled.17 In any case, the 
European Parliament has already demonstrated that it does not shy away from rejecting 
international agreements even in the final ratification stage, such as in the case of ACTA, the 
SWIFT Agreement, and the 2011 EU-Morocco Fisheries Partnership Agreement. 
2.1.3  Other policies 
Despite the Barroso Commission’s declared commitment to prioritise the multilateral trading 
system, the efforts to adapt the WTO to the changing environment had limited success. The 
Doha development agenda negotiations remained largely blocked, with the sole exception of 
the ‘Bali Package’ concluded in December 2013, which consisted of the trade facilitation 
agreement and several ministerial decisions focussing on agricultural trade.18 
Other noteworthy proposals by the Barroso Commission related to the EU’s international 
investment policy (in the light of the EU’s new competences in that area):19 the international 
 
14 In a letter sent to both the President of the Commission and of the Parliament, the President of the General 
Affairs Council complained that “the Framework Agreement has the effect of modifying the balance established 
by the Treaties between the Institutions, according powers to the Parliament not conferred by the Treaties and 
limiting the autonomy of the Commission and its President” (Council of the European Union, 12964/10 JUR 384 
INST 302). 
15 Case C-658/11, Parliament v Council, EU:C:2014:2025; Case C-263/14, Parliament v Council, EU:C:2016:435. 
16 Interinstitutional Agreement between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the 
European Commission on Better Law-Making[2016] OJ L123/1. 
17 The European Parliament’s co-negotiators on this issue wrote a letter to the Council Presidency on 18 April 2019 
in which they conveyed their “deep disappointment at the lack of successful conclusion of the interinstitutional 
talks [...] in accordance with the provisions of Paragraph 40 of the Interinstitutional Agreement on Better-Law 
making” and stressed that “it is highly regrettable that, throughout the process, the Council has maintained an 
intransigent attitude, in sharp contrast with the constructive attitude of the other three negotiating parties”. 
18 Council of the EU, WTO: “Council approves protocol on trade facilitation”, press release, 1 October 2015. 
19 European Commission, “Towards a comprehensive European international investment policy”, COM (2010) 343 final. 
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procurement instrument,20 increased efforts to reform the Union’s trade defence 
instruments,21 and the EU’s conflict mineral regulation.22 Moreover, the EU reformed its 
general system of preferences (GSP) in Regulation (EU) 978/2012:23 it broadened the list of 
international conventions relevant for the GSP+-treatment, going beyond the core labour 
conventions and also covering sustainable development and human rights. It also developed 
stricter economic eligibility criteria, reflecting the changed focus on least developed countries.   
Leaving office with a bang, the Barroso Commission and its Trade Commissioner Karel De Gucht 
decided on their last day in office to bring a test case, to clarify once and for all the scope of 
the reformed CCP by requesting an ECJ Opinion pursuant to Article 218 (11) TFEU. In its Opinion 
2/15, the Court largely supported the Commission’s expansive view of the scope of the Union’s 
exclusive competence pursuant to Article 207 TFEU, with the notable exception of portfolio 
investment and investor-state dispute settlement mechanisms, which remain competences the 
Union shares with the member states.  
2.2 The Juncker Commission 
When the Juncker Commission took office, several elements of the EU’s trade and investment 
policy were being contested internally and put under strain externally. The Commission reacted 
with several important initiatives. In the 2015 ‘Trade for All’ strategy, Trade Commissioner 
Cecilia Malmström laid down the blueprint for strengthening the effectiveness, transparency, 
and value-dimension of the EU’s trade policy.24 ‘Trade for all’ also spelled out the objective of 
focussing on new trade-related issues affecting the economy, such as services and digital trade. 
Particular attention was paid to ensuring that small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) 
benefitted from more open markets, for example by including SME chapters in the new 
generation of EU trade agreements.  
2.2.1 Sustainable development 
The Juncker Commission undertook increased efforts to implement the mandate of Article 21 
TEU to link the EU’s trade policy with its values by, inter alia, strengthening the EU FTAs’ 
 
20 European Commission, “Proposal for a Regulation on the access of third-country goods and services to the 
Union’s internal market in public procurement and procedures supporting negotiations on access of Union goods 
and services to the public procurement markets of third countries”, COM (2012) 060 final. 
21 European Commission, “Communication on Modernisation of Trade Defence Instruments Adapting trade 
defence instruments to the current needs of the European economy”, COM (2013) 191 final. 
22 European Commission, “Proposal for a Regulation setting up a Union system for supply chain due diligence self-
certification of responsible importers of tin, tantalum and tungsten, their ores, and gold originating in conflict-
affected and high-risk areas”, COM (2014) 111 final. 
23 Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 applying a 
scheme of generalised tariff preferences and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 732/2008 (OJ 2012, L 303). 
24 European Commission, “Trade for all. Towards a more responsible trade and investment policy”, COM(2015) 
497 final, 14 October 2015. 
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commitments in the field of environmental, social and labour protection, and human rights,25 
and by reforming its GSP scheme to target LDCs. It also reduced benefits for countries unwilling 
to subscribe to sustainable development policies, and for countries that might be developing 
overall, but which are home to competitive industries that operate at arm’s length with EU 
industries. For example, trade and sustainable development (TSD) chapters, which contain 
commitments to respect multilateral labour and environmental agreements, and ensure that 
standards are not lowered to attract trade, have become standard in EU FTAs. Critics have 
questioned the Commission’s commitment to these obligations, highlighting their exemption 
from the general dispute settlement mechanism established by FTAs.26 Instead, they are 
subject to a juridically more flexible (‘weaker’) procedure, involving monitoring groups, 
representatives of civil society, and a panel of experts. In 2018 Commissioner Malmström 
presented a 15-point plan to increase the effectiveness of TSD chapters.27 A year later, the 
Commission launched its first TSD enforcement case, regarding Korea’s alleged violation of its 
TSD obligations pursuant to the 2010 EU-Korea FTA.28 
2.2.2  Contestation of the EU’s trade policies 
Negotiations on the new generation of EU FTAs, in particular those on CETA and TTIP, triggered 
a heated debate about the benefits and consequences of these far-reaching trade agreements. 
These discussions went beyond the familiar pro- and anti-trade constituencies such as business 
groups or far-left political quarters. Trade issues were discussed on the front pages of 
newspapers, and triggered some of Europe’s biggest demonstrations of the past decades. 
Parliaments, governments, political parties and other civic groups contested the desirability 
and the added value of the envisaged new generation of EU FTAs, highlighting the danger of 
negative externalities for environmental and consumer protection, public services and labour 
standards. Another topic that attracted wide attention beyond the usual anti-globalisation and 
anti-investment lobbyists was the claim that investors benefitted unduly from positive 
discrimination. It was asserted that investors could stifle the democratic process (right to 
regulate)by being allowed to circumvent regular courts by bringing claims to investment 
tribunals, targeting in particular the initial proposals for investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) 
mechanisms in TTIP and CETA.  
The Commission responded with efforts to increase the transparency of trade negotiations: 
inviting the Council to disclose all FTA negotiating directives; publishing its own proposals 
during the negotiations; and reporting the preliminary results of each negotiation round, and 
 
25 See for example “Non-paper of the Commission services -Trade and Sustainable Development (TSD) chapters in 
EU Free Trade Agreements (FTAs)”, 11 July 2017. 
26 A. Marx, et al., “Dispute  Settlement in the Trade  and Sustainable Development Chapters of EU Trade Agreements”, 
Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies (2017), (https://ghum.kuleuven.be/ggs/publications/books/final-report-
9-february-def.pdf). 
27 European Commission, “Commissioner Malmström unveils 15-point plan to make EU trade and sustainable 
development chapters more effective”, Press Release, 27 February 2018. 
28 See: https://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/accessing-markets/dispute-settlement/bilateral-disputes/ and 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1803 
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of the consolidated negotiation text.29 Moreover, MEPs successfully used the Access to 
Documents Regulation 1049/2001 to challenge Council and Commission refusals to grant 
access to information during negotiations of international trade agreements.30 
In an effort to accommodate the concerns about ISDS in TTIP, the Commission fundamentally 
modified its position on ISDS by introducing a proposal for a new investment court system’ (ICS, 
cf. infra). The Commission increased civil society participation in the EU’s decision-making 
process, allowing, for example, engagement in the sustainability impact assessments (SIAs) 
prepared for envisaged trade agreements. 
2.2.3 The FTA agenda 
Several FTAs with key trade partners were signed, among them Canada (2016), Japan (2018), 
Singapore (2018), and Vietnam (2019). Moreover, negotiations with Mexico and MERCOSUR 
were finalised and trade talks with Australia, New Zealand, Chile, and Tunisia intensified.31 
However, not all EU FTA negotiations launched in this period have been successful. 
Negotiations with the US on TTIP were suspended shortly after Donald Trump took office in 
2017. EU-US trade relations deteriorated further following the unilateral trade measures 
imposed by the Trump administration. Invoking the national security clause of its Trade Act 
(‘Section 232’), the US government imposed duties of 25% and 10% respectively on imports of 
steel and aluminium from the EU on 1 June 2018,thereby exceeding its bound tariffs pursuant 
to Article II GATT. The EU's response has been three-pronged, in line with a strategy outlined 
by the Commission in March 2018.32 Firstly, the EU reacted by adopting rebalancing measures 
under the safeguards agreement that target a list of US products worth €2.8 billion, including 
steel and aluminium products, agricultural goods and various other products.33 Second, the EU, 
together with several trade partners, launched legal proceedings against the US at the WTO by 
filing a request for consultations. Despite the current US administration's invocation of essential 
security interests (Art. XXI GATT), the EU considers these tariffs to be safeguard measures in 
disguise, and not compatible with US obligations under the WTO agreement.34 Third, in 
 
29 For an overview, see A. Marx, G. Van der Loo, “Transparency in EU Trade Policy: Achievements and Challenges”, 
RECONNECT Working Paper (forthcoming 2020). 
30 Case T-529/09, in ‘t Veld v Council [2012] ECLI:EU:T:2012:215, para.39; and Case C-350/12 P, Council v in ‘t Veld 
para. 58. 
31 For an overview, see (https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/december/tradoc_118238.pdf). 
32 European Commission, “European Commission outlines EU plan to counter US trade restrictions on steel and 
aluminium”, press release, 7 March 2018; for an early analysis of such an approach cf. M. Hahn, “Balancing or 
Bending? Unilateral Reactions to Safeguard Measures”, Journal of World Trade 39 (2006), pp. 301-326.  
33 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/886 of 20 June 2018 on certain commercial policy measures 
concerning certain products originating in the United States of America and amending Implementing Regulation 
(EU) 2018/724 (OJ 2018, L 158). 
34 WTO, “United States - Certain Measures on Steel and Aluminium Products; Request for consultations by the 
European Union”, WT/DS548/1, 1 June 2018. 
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February 2019 the Commission imposed safeguard measures on imports of steel products,35 
exempting only the EEA countries, as imports of steel products into the EU had increased 
sharply due to the diversion of pertinent products to the EU market as a consequence of the 
US measures. President Juncker’s visit to Washington in July 2018 led to the Trump 
administration’s holding back on imposing additional tariffs of 20% on EU automobiles and auto 
parts.36 The EU and the US agreed, inter alia, to work on “zero tariffs, zero non-tariff barriers, 
and zero subsidies on non-auto industrial goods” and tasked an executive working group with 
finding common ground. As a consequence, the Commission adopted proposals in January 
2019 for negotiating directives on conformity assessment and on the elimination of tariffs for 
industrial goods,37 which were adopted by the Council.38 Negotiations are yet to begin: whereas 
the US aims at abolishing tariffs for both industrial and agricultural goods, the EU is not 
prepared to include agricultural goods in the discussions. The Airbus-Boeing saga39 continued, 
with successes (and corresponding losses) on both sides, and surprisingly with recent hopes 
that an arrangement can be found pro futuro.40 
For economic or political reasons, a lack of progress also characterised FTA negotiations with 
several Asian countries, including Indonesia, the Philippines and Myanmar. After the military 
takeover in Thailand, the EU suspended negotiations with that country in 2014; after almost six 
years of efforts, talks with India were brought to a de facto standstill in the summer of 2013 
due to a mismatch in levels of ambition. Despite a commitment by both sides at the 2017 EU-
India summit to end this impasse, no new progress has so far been made.41 Due to the political 
situation in Turkey, the Council has yet to agree to begin formal negotiations on the 
modernisation of the EU-Turkey customs union. Progress with regard to the EU-Morocco 
DCFTA has been hampered by several ECJ rulings on the application of the existing EU-Morocco 
 
35 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/159 of 31 January 2019 imposing definitive safeguard 
measures against imports of certain steel products (OJ 2019, L 31/1). 
36 “Joint U.S.-EU Statement following President Juncker's visit to the White House”, 25 July 2018. 
37 European Commission, “Commission publishes proposal for agreement on conformity assessment with United 
States”, press release, 22 November 2019. 
38 Council of the EU, “Trade with the United States: Council authorises negotiations on elimination of tariffs for 
industrial goods and on conformity assessment”, press release, 15 April 2019. 
39See, e.g., M. Hahn, ‘“It’s a Bird, It’s a Plane“’: Some Remarks on the Airbus Appellate Body Report (EC and Certain 
Member states – Large Civil Aircraft, WT/DS316/AB/R)’, World Trade Review 12 (2013), pp. 139-161.  
40Statements by the United States at the August 28, 2020, DSB Meeting (https://geneva.usmission.gov/2020/ 
08/28/statements-by-the-united-states-at-the-august-28-2020-dsb-meeting/): “The United States is committed 
to obtaining a long-term resolution to this dispute. The United States recently showed great restraint in its review 
of WTO-authorized countermeasures for the EU’s WTO-inconsistent launch aid subsidies. And the United States 
intends to begin a new process with the EU in an effort to reach an agreement that will remedy the conduct that 
harmed the U.S. aviation industry and workers and will ensure a level playing field for U.S. companies”[emphasis 
added]. This cryptic statement is understood by some to mean a softening of the US position. See also 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_1405.  
41 Council of the EU, “EU-India summit: joint statement and joint declarations”, press release, 6 October 2017.  
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trade agreements to the Western Sahara. However, in the summer of 2019 both parties 
declared their willingness to relaunch negotiations.42 
Progress with regard to signing and implementing the Economic Partnership Agreements 
(EPAs) with the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries was also slow. Among the seven 
regional groups, only the CARIFORUM has so far concluded a full regional EPA. Some members 
of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS), the East African Community and the other groups have concluded 
regional or bilateral interim EPAs restricted to trade in goods. However, many EPAs still await 
conclusion and implementation; the interim EPAs are supposed to develop into full regional 
agreements.43 
Since September 2018, the EU and the ACP countries are in the process of redefining their 
partnership for the time after the expiration of the Cotonou Agreement in 2020. In December 
2017, the Commission proposed an umbrella agreement establishing common values and 
interests ('common foundation') and three geographically distinct protocols ('regional 
partnerships') with, respectively, African, Caribbean, and Pacific member states of the ACP 
group.44 Pursuant to the Commission, EPAs are supposed to remain the central instruments for 
EU-ACP trade and should allow flexibility as to the number of participants and the respective 
substantive ambition. Negotiations at the level of the three regional components were officially 
started in early 2019. With regard to the African pillar of the new EU-ACP partnership, it is 
noteworthy that the member states of the African Union have established the African 
Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). On that basis, the EU Commission is starting exploratory 
work with regard to a continent-to-continent free trade area.45 
The architecture of EU trade and investment agreements changed following the Wallonian 
government’s temporary blockade of CETA in 2016. After this ‘CETA saga’, a broader discussion 
ensued on whether in addition to the EU, all member states need be involved in the conclusion 
and ratification of trade agreements (as so-called ‘mixed agreements’) or whether these FTAs 
should only be concluded by the EU (as so-called ‘EU-only agreements’), thus avoiding the risk 
that one member state could block at the last minute the conclusion of an EU FTA for the entire 
EU.46 This discussion took place in parallel with the landmark Opinion 2/15, in which the court 
gave a broad reading of the EU’s post-Lisbon trade competences, and concluded that almost 
 
42 On this issue, see G. Van der Loo, “The Dilemma of the EU’s Future Trade Relations with Western Sahara: Caught 
between strategic interests and international law?”, CEPS Policy Brief, 20 April 2018. 
43 For an overview of the state of pay of the EPAs (http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2009/ 
september/tradoc_144912.pdf). 
44 European Commission, “Recommendation for a Partnership Agreement between the European Union and 
countries of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States”, COM(2017) 763 final. 
45 See for example, European Commission, “State of the Union 2018: Towards a new 'Africa - Europe Alliance' to 
deepen economic relations and boost investment and jobs”, press release 12 September 2018. 
46 On this issue, see G. Van der Loo, “The role of national parliaments in mixed trade agreements”, CLEER paper 
2018/1; G. Van der Loo, R. A. Wessel, “The non-ratification of mixed agreements: Legal consequences and 
solutions”, Common Market Law Review 54(3), 2017, pp. 735–770. 
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the entire EU-Singapore FTA fell within the exclusive competences of the EU, with the 
exceptions of portfolio investment and ISDS.  
In light of Opinion 2/15, the Commission proposed to separate (“split”) future trade and 
investment agreements in EU-only FTAs, addressing issues for which the EU has been vested 
with exclusive competence, and a separate investment agreement, concluded as mixed 
agreement. Such an approach would clearly reduce the situations in which (now) 28 ratification 
procedures – by the Union and by all member states – would be needed.47 In May 2018, the 
Council largely agreed with this proposal, but reserved the right to decide on a case-by-case 
basis whether to separate international economic agreements. Also, FTAs concluded in the 
context of association relationships would remain mixed (e.g. the FTAs with Mercosur, Mexico, 
and Chile).48 In the meantime, the Union has signed its first ‘split’ FTAs and investment 
protection agreements (IPAs) with Singapore (2018) and Vietnam (2019). 
2.2.4 Investment protection: the Investment Court System and Opinion 1/17 
In response to the contestation of the ISDS mechanism initially envisaged in TTIP and CETA, the 
Commission submitted in 2015 a proposal for a new system to resolve disputes between 
investors and states. Drawing on the results of a 2014 public consultation on the EU's approach 
to investment protection and investment dispute settlement,49 the Commission proposed and 
rapidly implemented the Investment Court System (ICS) in its treaty practice. The ICS has 
already been integrated into CETA and in the EU’s IPAs with Vietnam, Singapore, and the 
negotiated trade agreement with Mexico. The ICS is characterised by a two-step adjudicative 
architecture (not unlike the now non-operational WTO dispute settlement mechanism), with a 
tribunal of first instance and an appeals tribunal. It aims to address the main concerns about 
the traditional ISDS mechanism by, inter alia, limiting the grounds on which an investor can 
challenge a state measure by laying down more precise standards for acceptable state 
measures; ensuring governments’ right to regulate and to pursue legitimate public policy 
objectives; and by including specific rules on transparency and the qualification of judges. 
In parallel to the integration of the ICS in its bilateral FTAs or IPAs, the Commission proposed in 
2017 to establish a multilateral investment court (MIC).50 This MIC would be a permanent 
independent international court tasked with resolving investment disputes between investors 
and states that had accepted its jurisdiction. Negotiations are taking place in the context of 
Working Group III of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) 
on ISDS reform. The next session is planned for October 2020. As a long-term goal, the EU aims 
 
47 European Commission, “A Balanced and Progressive Trade Policy to Harness Globalisation”, COM(2017) 492 final. 
48 Council of the European Union, “Conclusion on the negotiations of trade agreements”, 8 May 2018. 
49 European Commission, “Online public consultation on investment protection and investor-to-state dispute 
settlement (ISDS) in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership Agreement (TTIP)” (https://trade.ec. 
europa.eu/consultations/index.cfm?consul_id=179). 
50 European Commission, “Recommendation for a Council Decision authorising the opening of negotiations for a 
Convention establishing a multilateral court for the settlement of investment disputes”, COM (2017) 493 final. 
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to replace its bilateral ICSs with the MIC.51 Significantly, the ECJ ruled in Opinion 1/17 that that 
CETA’s ICS was compatible with EU law, in particular with the ‘autonomy of the EU legal order’, 
with the general principle of equal treatment and the requirement of effectiveness, and lastly 
with the right of access to an independent tribunal.52 By concluding that the ICS included in the 
new generation of EU FTAs or IPAs can be reconciled with EU constitutional requirements, the 
court backed the Commission’s efforts to modernise ISDS. It should however be noted that the 
establishment of a MIC has yet to attract the support of major investor countries such as China, 
Japan, or the US. 
A key reason for the court to accept ICS were several treaty provisions safeguarding the 
‘autonomy’ of the Union legal order and the ECJ’s last word on all aspects of EU law. These 
clauses, which relate, inter alia, to the applicable law for the ICS Tribunals and to the 
determination of the respondent and the parties’ right to regulate, were included in light of the 
far-reaching autonomy jurisprudence53 to avoid any encroachment by the ICS tribunal on the 
ECJ’s ability to authoritatively interpret EU law and, therefore, on the autonomy of the EU legal 
order. The court considered that these clauses were sufficient – and essential – for their 
compatibility with EU law. Therefore, it appears that future trade agreements including ICS-like 
mechanisms may only pass ECJ scrutiny if they are flanked by similar autonomy safeguards on 
applicable law, the determination of the respondent, the right to regulate, and financial 
accessibility for natural persons and SMEs. Also in the area of investment protection, the impact 
of Opinion 1/17 on existing and future intra- and extra-EU BITs will need to be considered and 
addressed. With regard to extra-EU BITs, the member states should take the necessary steps 
to align their extra-EU BITs with Opinion 1/17 by including CETA-like autonomy safeguard 
clauses. Significantly, the Council’s negotiating directives for a convention setting up a MIC 
state that the convention should allow the member states to bring their extra-EU BITs under 
the jurisdiction of the MIC.54 
The future of the existing intra-EU BITs are facing extinction. Since the court’s ruling in Achmea 
in 2018, they looked like an endangered species, a status now confirmed by Declarations of the 
member states on 15 and 16 January 2019 on the legal consequences of Achmea,55 and the 
‘Agreement for the termination of Bilateral investment Treaties between the member states of 
the European Union’, signed by 23 member states.56 However, member states could not agree 
 
51In March 2018, the Council authorised the Commission to open negotiations for a Convention establishing such 
an MIC: Council of the EU, “Negotiating directives for a Convention establishing a multilateral court for the 
settlement of investment disputes”, 12981/17, 1 March 2018. 
52 Opinion 1/17 (CETA), ECLI:EU:C:2019:341. 
53See the contributions of M. Hahn and G. Van der Loo in M. Hahn & G. Van der Loo (eds.), Law and Practice of the 
Common Commercial Policy, Brill 2020.  
54 Council of the EU, “Negotiating directives for a Convention establishing a multilateral court for the settlement 
of investment disputes”, 12981/17 ADD 1 DCL 1, 20 March 2018, para. 17. 
55 Declaration of the Member states of 15 and 16 January 2019 on the legal consequences of the Achmea judgment 
and on investment (https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/190117-bilateral-investment-treaties_en). 
56OJ L 169/1-41 of 29 May 2020; cf. Also https://ec.europa.eu/info/files/200505-bilateral-investment-treaties-
agreement_en. Several member states did not sign the agreement. The Commission has announced that it will 
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on the implications of Achmea for the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT). Against this background, 
one of the challenges for the negotiations for a modernised energy charter treaty, which 
started in July 2020,will be to comply with the criteria laid down in Opinion 1/17. 
Further in the area of investment, the EU recently adopted a screening framework for foreign 
direct investments. Regulation (EU) 2019/452 provides a framework for the screening of direct 
investments from non-EU countries on grounds of security or public order.57 It allows member 
states to have transparent, predictable, and non-discriminatory mechanisms for examining 
incoming foreign direct investment on grounds of security or public order, and establishes 
cooperation procedures between the member states and the European Commission. 
2.2.5 WTO reform 
The quest for WTO reform received added urgency under the Juncker Commission. Against a 
background of a stalling Doha round, trade tension increased further due to what was 
perceived by many as Chinese circumventions of trade rules, and aggressive protectionism and 
rejection of the rule of law in international economic relations by the current US administration. 
Efforts by the Commission, often joined by like-minded countries such as Canada or 
Switzerland, to prevent the complete demise of the multilateral trading system have only had 
limited success. Beyond the current crisis of the WTO appellate body (see below), a 
comprehensive reform and modernisation of the WTO is called for: certain old disciplines 
enshrined in the multilateral trading system, such as those related to subsidies and state-
owned enterprises, have not been adapted sufficiently to the new realities of international 
trade. Also, many new topics (such as data, climate change, and competition) have received 
attention only in recent bilateral FTAs. The EU has continued its efforts to keep the WTO 
relevant with regard to substantive rules: so, for example, plurilateral WTO negotiations on e-
commerce were launched in Davos in January 2019 after a year of exploratory talks. Also some 
modest progress seems to have been made with regard to fisheries subsidies. 
In September 2018, the Commission published proposals for WTO reform, focussing on (i) 
rulemaking and development; (ii) regular work and transparency; and (iii) dispute settlement,58 
and advocated its approach in various fora, including the EU-China working group on WTO 
reform, the trilateral ministerial working group with Japan and the US, and the G20. Several 
countries have aligned themselves with specific elements of the Union’s proposals. For 
example, in November 2018 the Commission submitted a concrete proposal for the reform of 
the WTO appellate body, anticipating the current crisis of the dispute settlement mechanism 
that has been triggered by the complete blockade of appellate body appointments and the 
 
initiate infringement procedures against EU member states that do not terminate their intra-EU bilateral 
investment treaties (European Commission, “EU Member States agree on a plurilateral treaty to terminate 
bilateral investment treaties”, Statement, 24 October 2019). For example in May 2020, the Commission sent 
letters of formal notice to Finland and the UK for failing to effectively remove intra-EUBITS  from their legal orders. 
57 Regulation (EU) 2019/452 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 March 2019 establishing a 
framework for the screening of foreign direct investments into the Union (OJ 2019, L 79/1). 
58 European Commission, ‘EU Concept Paper on WTO Reform’, 18 September 2018. 
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ensuing breakdown of the body in December 2019.59 This has paved the way for the conclusion 
of a multi-party interim appeal arbitration arrangement, pursuant to Article 25 of the DSU, 
which has so far attracted Australia, Benin, Brazil, Canada, China, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Ecuador, the European Union, Guatemala, Hong Kong, Iceland, Mexico, Montenegro, New 
Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Singapore, Switzerland, Ukraine, and Uruguay.60 Of 
course neither the member responsible for the appellate body’s demise, nor frequent users 
such as India, Indonesia, Japan, and Thailand could be integrated, let alone Russia. The 
agreement mirrors the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding’s appeal rules and can be used 
between any member of the WTO willing to join, as long as the WTO appellate body is not fully 
functional.61 
2.2.6 Trade defence and other policies 
One of the legacies of the Juncker Commission in the field of trade has been the reform of its 
trade remedies arsenal as well as of other trade-related legislation. In the area of trade defence, 
the EU modernised its toolbox by adopting Regulation (EU) 2018/825 (the ‘modernisation 
package’),62 which, inter alia, enables the EU to impose higher duties in some cases by limiting 
the scope of application of the lesser duty rule, shortens the investigation period to accelerate 
the procedure, increases the relevance of social and environmental standards in anti-dumping 
investigations, and introduces ‘pre-disclosure’ to soften the blow for traders being investigated. 
Prior to that, the EU had already adopted a new anti-dumping methodology in Regulation (EU) 
2017/2321, introducing a new way of calculating dumping margins in case of ‘significant 
distortions’ in the market of the exporting country.63 Moreover, in order to find approval by 
the legislator for its 2012 proposal, the Commission adopted in 2016 an amended version for 
an international procurement instrument that would enable it to open investigations into 
alleged discrimination against EU parties in foreign public procurement markets.64 In addition, 
it would allow the Commission to enter into consultations with the third country concerned to 
obtain reciprocal concessions on the partner’s procurement market. As a last resort, the 
 
59 European Commission, “WTO reform: EU proposes way forward on the functioning of the Appellate Body”, Press 
Release, 26 November 2018. 
60 Council of the European Union, 2 April 2020, Doc. No. 112/20 
(https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/43334/st07112-en20.pdf). 
61 European Commission, “Trade: EU and 16 WTO members agree to work together on an interim appeal 
arbitration arrangement”, press release, 24 January 2020. 
62 Regulation (EU) 2018/825 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2018 amending Regulation 
(EU) 2016/1036 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Union and 
Regulation (EU) 2016/1037 on protection against subsidised imports from countries not members of the European 
Union (OJ 2018, L 143/1).  
63 Regulation (EU) 2017/2321 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2017 amending 
Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European 
Union and Regulation (EU) 2016/1037 on protection against subsidised imports from countries not members of 
the European Union (OJ 2017, L 338). 
64 European Commission, ‘Amended proposal for a Regulation on the access of third-country goods and services 
to the Union’s internal market in public procurement and procedures supporting negotiations on access of Union 
goods and services to the public procurement markets of third countries’ COM (2016) 34 final. 
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proposal foresees the imposition of a price penalty on tenders originating in the third country 
concerned. However, member states remain deeply divided over this issue, and the 
Commission proposal has so far not received the approval of the legislator. A last important 
legislative act worth mentioning is the Conflict Minerals regulation (Regulation (EU) 2017/821), 
adopted in May 2017.65 This regulation aims to ensure that EU importers of tin, tungsten, 
tantalum, and gold (3TG) meet international responsible sourcing standards set by the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and is supposed to break 
the link between conflict and the illegal exploitation of minerals by, inter alia, requiring EU 
companies to ensure they import these minerals and metals from responsible and conflict-free 
sources only. 
3. Priorities and challenges for the EU’s CCP under the ‘geopolitical’ von der 
Leyen Commission 
The section above illustrates the fast pace that has characterised the EU’s foreign economic 
relations since the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force a decade ago. Without much phasing-in, 
the EU institutions had to apply their newly conferred competences (such as in the area of 
investment) within a new institutional set-up in order to address the various internal and 
external challenges sketched above. Several of the post-Treaty of Lisbon CCP legislative 
initiatives and reforms or trade agreements entered into force just before or after the tenth 
birthday of the Lisbon Treaty. It would seem therefore too early for a comprehensive ex-post-
implementation assessment of several key features of the current CCP regulatory environment 
(e.g. the ICS included in bilateral FTAs or IPAs), although for several elements an official interim 
review has already taken place (e.g. for the GSP).66 However, these trade instruments will play 
an important role in the next decade of the EU’s CCP, together with legislative and treaty 
proposals that are already quite advanced (such as, e.g., in relation to the MIC, WTO reform 
and the International Procurement Instrument). In addition, President von der Leyen’s 
statements and actions so far seem to indicate that a more assertive approach will characterise 
the EU’s trade and investment policy in the coming years. The stated goal is to better align the 
EU’s internal and external action and to create a Union which is more strategic, more assertive, 
and more united in promoting its values and interests around the world.67 
This will be reflected in the new trade strategy expected by the end of 2020, which is supposed 
to contribute to “a swift and sustainable socio-economic recovery, reinforcing competitiveness 
in the post-Covid-19 world, and to explore how trade policy can help build a stronger EU based 
 
65 Regulation (EU) 2017/821 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 May 2017 laying down supply 
chain due diligence obligations for Union importers of tin, tantalum, and tungsten, their ores, and gold originating 
from conflict-affected and high-risk areas (OJ 2017, L 130). 
66 European Commission, “Mid-Term Evaluation of the EU’s Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP)”, 8 October 2018. 
67 European Commission, “Mission Letter from the President-elect of the European Commission to Commissioner-
designate for Trade”, 10 September 2019. 
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on a model of ‘Open Strategic Autonomy’”.68 The review is ongoing, and will be one of the first 
tasks of the incoming Trade Commissioner Dombrovskis.  
Some of the key priorities for the EU’s trade and investment policy follow.  
3.1 Restoring the multilateral trading system 
Against the background of the US-China trade dispute, the various forms of foul play practised 
by some trading partners, a paralysed WTO appellate body, and the success of identity politics 
and aggressive nationalism outside the Union, one of the key priorities for the new Commission 
will be to preserve and develop the current public international law of international commerce. 
The obvious first endeavour will be to revitalise a semi-comatose rules-based multilateral 
trading system, possibly accepting second-best solutions. Thus, the EU will continue to lead 
efforts to reform the WTO, not only in relation to its dispute settlement mechanism, but also 
with regard to its rulebook, inter alia, in the area of services, subsidies, forced technology 
transfer, and the ‘Special and Differential Treatment’ for developing countries. The EU will also 
aim to conclude the plurilateral negotiations on e-commerce and other crucial WTO 
negotiations on, for example, fisheries subsidies, investment facilitation, and domestic 
regulation. Moreover, together with like-minded countries, the EU will further lead different 
initiatives that aim to strengthen WTO membership to deal with the trade-related (restrictive) 
measures in response to the Covid-19 pandemic. For example, in June 2020 the EU and 12 
partner countries (the ‘Ottawa Group’) adopted a statement which puts forward six policy 
actions, ranging from transparency and the withdrawal of trade-restrictive measures and 
initiatives on medical supplies to predictable trade in agricultural and agri-food products.69 This 
group has already made specific proposals in the area of transparency, encouraging the WTO 
secretariat to intensify the monitoring and increase the frequency of reporting, and also by 
leading by example. The EU has already notified to the WTO temporary trade measures taken 
in the context of the coronavirus (e.g. export authorisation of supplies of personal protective 
equipment (PPE)).70 In the area of investment protection, the EU will further pursue its 
multilateral MIC project in the framework of UNCITRAL. While its partner countries have so far 
been less than enthusiastic, the Commission counts on the success of its perseverance.  
3.2 Enforcement and maintenance of a level playing field 
The more assertive approach of the new geopolitical Commission is already discernible from its 
increased efforts to establish a level playing field at the multilateral level and in its bilateral 
partnerships, with a new focus on reciprocity and enforcement. For example, in order to 
protect to the EU’s trade interests in times of a potentially paralysed WTO DSM, the new 
Commission adopted in December 2019 a proposal to amend the enforcement regulation. The 
 
68European Commission, “A renewed trade policy for a stronger Europe - Consultation Note”, 16 June 2020. 
69See: https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2020/june/tradoc_158777.pdf 
70For an overview, see: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/Covid19_e/notifications_e.htm and 
https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=2131 
EU TRADE AND INVESTMENT POLICY SINCE THE TREATY OF LISBON | 17 
 
main focus and objective of this reform proposal is to prepare "for situations where, after the 
Union has succeeded in obtaining a favourable ruling from a WTO dispute settlement panel, 
the process is blocked because the other party appeals a WTO panel report ‘into the void’ and 
has not agreed to interim appeal arbitration under Article 25 of the WTO DSU."71 In addition, 
the EU aims to better protect its trade interests by actively using its recently adopted 
investment screening framework, increasingly relying on the DSMs included in its bilateral FTAs 
(as evidenced by the recent cases launched under the DCFTA with Ukraine and the EU-SADC 
EPA), establishing an international procurement instrument, and by developing an instrument 
to tackle the distortive effects caused by foreign subsidies.72 In order to streamline these 
different enforcement policies, in July 2020 the EU appointed Denis Redonnet as the EU’s first 
Chief Trade Enforcement Officer (CTEO) with the rank of a Deputy Director-General. The CTEO 
will supervise and direct the implementation and enforcement of the EU’s trade agenda, 
including the enforcement of EU FTAs (including the TSD chapters), trade defence, dispute 
settlement, market access policies, and the investment screening framework.  
3.3 Trade relations with the US 
A review of the Union’s trade policy would be incomplete without a review of the efforts to 
recalibrate its trading partnerships with two partners that also happen to be genuine 
superpowers: China and the US.  
Regarding the latter, the slow progress in the negotiations on the proposed agreement on 
industrial goods illustrates that improving or even stabilising trade relations with the US will be 
an extraordinarily challenging undertaking. This is a truism for the current Trump 
administration; however, while a Biden presidency could reintroduce rationality into the 
foreign policy of the Union’s most important partner, and would probably correct the cavalier 
attitude vis-à-vis legal obligations, a Biden-Harris administration would have to accommodate 
the traditionally trade-sceptic American trade unions.  
For all these reasons, it is unlikely that the EU will come up with ambitious trade initiatives with 
regard to the US before spring 2021. The impossibility of any grand bargain does not exclude 
important technical developments: in August 2020 the EU and the US agreed on a small 
package of tariff reductions. The EU will eliminate tariffs on live and frozen products, starting 
in the calendar year 2020, and the US will reduce by 50% its tariff rates on certain products 
which are exported by the EU. Both trade liberalisations are taken on an MFN basis.73 Heralded 
as the first negotiated tariff reduction between the EU and the US, this modest agreement 
 
71 European Commission, “Proposal for a Regulation amending Regulation (EU) No 654/2014 of the European 
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should be understood as an attempt by the EU to defuse the trade tensions, including the 
ongoing the Airbus-Boeing dispute, and to avoid new (WTO-incompatible) US tariffs on other 
products such as cars. In a similar fashion, a recent agreement between the EU and the US 
revisits the truce following EC-Hormones and constitutes another attempt to de-escalate EU-
US trade tensions. The existing import quota for hormone-free beef will be modified so as to 
ring-fence 35,000 tonnes out of the total 45,000 tonne TRQ for United States exports.  
The comprehensive North Atlantic trade agreement (TTIP) envisaged under the Obama-Biden 
administration remains a very tall order, even if the former Vice-President is elected as the 46th 
US President. Be that as it may, for the time being, the US remains the indispensable Western 
power in the WTO: the EU will need this ally in order to, inter alia, address constructively 
structural reforms of the WTO.  
3.4 Trade relations with China 
The EU’s 2019 China Strategy labelled China as a key partner for cooperation, but also a 
“systemic rival” and a “strategic competitor” in the trade context. The Commission highlighted 
the protectionist measures benefitting its industrial champions, shielding them from 
competition through selective market opening, licensing, and other investment restrictions; 
heavy subsidies to both state-owned and private sector companies; closure of its procurement 
market; localisation requirements and the favouring of domestic operators in the protection 
and enforcement of IPR, and other domestic laws.74 With the benefit of hindsight, it is clear 
that the Union’s past reluctance to adapt to an increasingly aggressive China did not produce 
the intended result. In the future, the EU will seek a recalibration of the bilateral relationship 
and in particular a more balanced and reciprocal economic exchange. The new enforcement 
mechanisms (e.g. the investment screening framework, the public procurement instrument, a 
foreign subsidies instrument, and the enforcement regulation) are tools for achieving these 
goals. The conclusion of the EU-China comprehensive agreement on investment (CAI) should 
address some of the current asymmetries in market access. The agreement on geographical 
indications, signed in the margins of the (virtual, given Covid-19) EU-China Summit on 14 
September 2020, may be perceived as a first modest success in levelling the playing field.75 
During the June 2020 EU-China high-level trade and economic dialogue (HED) the EU registered 
“significant progress made on the CAI’s level playing field-related issues”, while highlighting 
that significant work still remained to be undertaken with regard to key issues such as market 
access and sustainable development.76 Moreover, the EU reiterated the urgent need for China 
to engage in future negotiations on industrial subsidies. 
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The prospect of a trade war between the US and China and the collateral damage inflicted on 
the rest of the world shows the need for a modernised WTO. It will be crucial to have both 
countries on board in crucial areas such as subsidies and SoE, forced technology transfer, and 
special and differential treatment for developing countries. In contrast, a mere patchwork of 
plurilateral agreements without the US and China will not be able to create a sustainable 
multilateral trading system. The EU therefore welcomed during the June 2020 EU-China 
Summit the confirmation by China that the recent China-US ‘phase 1’ deal will be implemented 
“in full compatibility with WTO obligations and without discrimination against EU operators”. 
Of course, it remains to be seen how this agreement will be applied in practice and whether it 
will infringe on other WTO members rights. 
3.5 Expanding the FTA agenda 
In its bilateral relationships, the immediate task at hand is a successful conclusion of the trade 
and investments agreements currently under negotiation, including with Australia, New 
Zealand, Tunisia, and Mercosur. Ambitions for a continent-to-continent free trade area, 
bridging the EU internal market and the AfCFTA, and an FTA with India and other Asian partners, 
will take more time and sustained efforts. Whereas the FTA negotiations with Australia and 
New Zealand appear to be realistic deliverables, several member states and groups in the 
European Parliament have already flagged that they will not support the negotiated Mercosur 
FTA which, being part of a comprehensive mixed association agreement, will require ratification 
by 27 member states. 
The recent EU FTA implementation report shows that there is room for improvement with 
regard to preference utilisation rates for EU exports to trade partners under FTAs.77 The new 
Chief Trade Enforcement Officer could choose to improve the implementation of trade 
agreements through measures facilitating the use of preferential rates, especially by SMEs. 
With regard to transparency, the Commission has made significant progress in opening up 
trade negotiations towards the European Parliament and civil society. One specific area where 
there is room for improvement is in relation to the implementation of FTAs by decisions of joint 
bodies (e.g. committees). While international agreements concluded by the EU have always set 
up common bodies to facilitate their own amendment and implementation, the new 
generation of EU FTAs provide for frequent use of such bodies. The far-reaching and extensive 
competences include legislative powers to amend the trade agreement, to change the 
institutional architecture of the agreement, to adopt regulatory decisions, or to authoritatively 
interpret the provisions of the agreement. Generally speaking, the European Parliament is not 
involved in the decisions taken by joint treaty bodies to become binding on parties, as it is 
neither represented on the bodies nor allowed to participate in their internal procedures.78 In 
a resolution of 30 May 2018 on the interpretation and implementation of the 2016 
Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Law-Making, Parliament calls on the other institutions 
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to ensure that it is “accurately informed and involved in the implementation stage of the 
agreements, especially in regard to the decisions taken by the bodies set up by agreements”.79 
Broadening the reporting of committees established under FTAs to enhance public visibility and 
public accountability was one of the key elements of the new transparency package announced 
by then Trade Commissioner Hogan in February 2020. 
3.6 Brexit 
The EU aims to negotiate and ratify an agreement on a new partnership with the United 
Kingdom. Both sides have indicated that such an arrangement needs to be reached by October 
2020 so that parliamentary approval by all parliaments involved can be obtained before the 
transition period expires on 31 December 2020. However, such an outcome is becoming 
increasingly unlikely. In August 2020, the EU chief negotiator stated that he was “disappointed 
and concerned” about the progress made and “surprised” by the lack of willingness on the UK’s 
side to make progress on key issues agreed in the joint political declaration on the future 
partnership.80 The intention of the Johnson government to violate the terms of the withdrawal 
agreement with regard to Northern Ireland and citizens’ rights has led to the resignation of the 
head of the UK government’s legal department, who wanted to avoid breaking the UK civil 
service code by violating international law.81 Against this background, it is hardly surprising that 
little progress has been made on key issues such as state aid, equivalence, fisheries, and dispute 
settlement. On the occasion of the latest round of negotiations, EU chief negotiator Barnier 
recalled the principles agreed upon in the EU-UK political declaration: that the future 
agreement must encompass “robust commitments to prevent distortions of trade and unfair 
competitive advantages”. It must also uphold the common high standards applicable in the 
Union and the UK at the end of the transition period in the areas of state aid, competition, 
social and employment standards, environment, climate change, and relevant tax matters. 
Even a basic FTA limited to goods and services (which seems to be the preferred option for the 
current UK government) will not be easy to achieve, as the maintenance of a level playing field 
is a precondition for the EU, but conflicts with the ‘red lines’ of the Johnson government.  
3.7 Sustainable development 
The Commission is likely to continue to reinforce the sustainable development dimension of its 
trade policy. With regard to the TSD chapters in its FTAs, the Commission’s 2018 15-point plan 
provided a blueprint for increasing their effectiveness. However, it appears that there is 
appetite for more ambitious commitments in this area. For example, a May 2020 Franco-Dutch 
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non-paper on trade, socio-economic effects and sustainable development proposes to 
incentivise effective implementation of these chapters by rewarding partner countries that live 
up to TSD commitments82 by introducing a staggered implementation of tariff reduction linked 
to the effective implementation of TSD provisions, and by laying down precisely and in advance 
the conditions to be met as a precondition for advantageous customs tariffs. The proposal also 
discusses the possibility of withdrawal of those specific tariff lines in the event of a breach of 
those provisions. While these proposals may be a bridge too far for some member states, the 
integration of the Paris climate agreement commitments into the EU’s FTAs has become 
standard practice. The new CTEO is expected to monitor compliance with both the TSD 
chapters and the conditions for GSP(+) benefits. For example, in August 2020 the EU withdrew 
for the first time EBA preferences from Cambodia due to serious and systematic concerns 
related to the human rights situation in the beneficiary country. As the current GSP regime will 
expire on 31 December 2023, the European Commission has launched preparations to decide 
on the future of the GSP scheme. 
One of the most important – but also controversial – elements of the European Commission’s 
‘Green Deal’ is the proposal for a carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM). It aims to 
reduce the risk of carbon leakage by ensuring that the price of imports reflect more accurately 
their carbon content by imposing, for example, tariffs on the carbon content of materials and 
goods imported into the EU from countries that do not meet the EU’s environmental standards. 
Despite concerns as to the WTO-compatibility of the CBAM, the Commission views the CBAM 
as an important income source for financing the ‘Next Generation EU’post-Covid-19recovery 
package. A legislative proposal for a CBAM is expected in 2022. Finally, the Commission has 
announced that it will present by 2021 a legislative initiative on mandatory human rights and 
environmental due diligence obligations for EU companies. This will include liability and 
enforcement mechanisms and access to remedy provisions for victims of corporate abuse.83 
3.8 A renewed post-Covid-19 trade policy based on ‘open strategic autonomy’ 
The ongoing review of the EU’s trade policy is taking place in the broader context of the 
proposed post-Covid-19 recovery package ‘Next Generation EU’, which puts forward a model 
of ‘open strategic autonomy’ for the EU.84 This means “shaping the new system of global 
economic governance and developing mutually beneficial bilateral relations, while protecting 
ourselves from unfair and abusive practices”.85 The Commission’s consultation note on the 
review process identifies the following six priorities for the EU’s trade agenda: (i) building more 
resilience; (ii) supporting socio-economic recovery and growth; (iii)supporting SMEs; (iv) 
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supporting the digital transition and technological development; and (vi) ensuring fairness and 
a level playing field. A quick read of this document reveals that the ‘open strategic autonomy’ 
model for the EU’s trade policy will largely be a continuation of the more assertive EU trade 
policies already pursued or envisaged. It tries to combine the commitment to the rules-based 
multilateral trading system by establishing multilateral, plurilateral, and bilateral trade 
agreements and stabilising strategic engagement with key trading partners (the US and China) 
with a decidedly non-naïve attitude vis-à-vis unfair trade practices through, for example, are in 
forced foreign direct investment screening mechanism, an instrument on foreign subsidies and 
an international procurement instrument. 
Two elements that will receive more attention in the EU’s trade policy as a result of the (post-) 
Covid-19 economic context will be global supply chains and the green and digital transition. 
This twin transition is at the heart of the Commission’s recovery package, and will require the 
integration of objectives and policy instruments of the EU’s green deal and digital strategy into 
the CCP. With regard to global supply chains, the CCP will aim to strengthen supply-chain 
resilience and sustainability with a combination of diversification of supply at country and 
company level, strategic reserves and stockpiling, as well as the shortening of supply chains or 
increased domestic production. This will require the blending of the EU’s industrial strategy 
objectives and instruments into to the Union’s trade policy: the recent action plan on critical 
raw materials (proposed on 3 September 2020) is a good example of this approach.86 
4. Conclusion 
This paper demonstrates that since the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon more than a 
decade ago, the EU institutions have had to constantly use their newly conferred competences, 
such as in the area of investment, within a new institutional set-up to address the various 
internal and external challenges sketched above. Several of the post-Treaty of Lisbon CCP 
legislative initiatives and reforms or trade agreements are so new (some are even still under 
negotiation) that it seems premature to undertake a comprehensive assessment of the post-
Treaty of Lisbon CCP regime. However, these trade instruments will play an important role in 
the next decade of the EU’s CCP, together with legislative and treaty proposals that are already 
quite advanced. 
Whereas under the Barroso II Commission trade policy was framed as a key instrument to 
deliver the growth needed to emerge from the global financial crisis, in particular by developing 
a new generation of broad FTAs with the EU’s key trade partners, the ‘Trade for all’ strategy 
developed under the Juncker Commission aimed to strengthen the effectiveness, transparency 
and value of the EU’s CCP against the background of internal and external contestation of the 
EU’s trade policy. This is mirrored in the scope of a new generation of FTAs, more transparency 
during negotiations, a new system for investor-state disputes and a reformed trade defence 
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instruments’ arsenal. Attempts to rebuild the multilateral system for trade and investment, 
through proposals on WTO reform and the MIC, remain so far unsuccessful.  
From the very outset, the ‘geopolitical’ von der Leyen Commission seems to envisage a more 
assertive trade policy, doubling down on ensuring a level playing field and proper enforcement 
of EU trade instruments, as evidenced by major developments such as the creation of the 
position of a Chief Trade Enforcement Officer (CTEO) and proposals regarding a reinforced 
foreign direct investment screening mechanism, an instrument on foreign subsidies, an 
international procurement instrument and the modernisation of the enforcement regulation. 
The ongoing review of the EU’s trade policy will only confirm and further consolidate this 
approach. On the basis of the concept of ‘Open Strategic Autonomy’, which is at the heart of 
the current CCP review and is the new leitmotif for post-Covid 19 recovery, the EU will aim to 
assert its protection for European business and consumers.  
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